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Regardless of how the truth is measured, it can be argued that the truth itself is a rating. Even behavior measures are the ratings of an observer. So Kruglanski has argued that accuracy is special type of consensus; that is, accuracy represents the correspondence between two sets of ratings.
Beginning with a paper in 1955 by Lee Cronbach, accuracy
researchers had to face the issue that ratings should be decomposed into
components and that accuracy is the correspondence between those components.
Cronbach proposed four types of accuracy of a perceiver who rates several
targets on several traits:
The Social Relations Model decomposition of variance is different from that of Cronbach. It looks at the ratings of perceivers and targets for each trait whereas the Cronbach decomposition is of the ratings of targets and traits for each perceiver. Using the Social Relations Model to study accuracy, the focus is not on who is more accurate, but rather what is the level of accuracy in person perception and when are people accurate.
The Cronbach critique of accuracy research had a devastating effect on the area. In essence, it killed accuracy research for a generation. Researchers felt either that accuracy was too complicated to measure (something that may have been true at the time but no longer is), that it was impossible to measure (which is not true), or that accuracy did not exist (which may or may not be true, but probably is not). The essence of the Cronbach critique is that accuracy is not global but it is the correspondence between components.
William
Swann and others have argued that perceivers should be especially accurate
at predicting how others would behave when interacting with the perceiver,
something Swann calls circumscribed accuracy. Surprisingly, there is little
or no evidence of dyadic target accuracy. More research is needed, but
it might be the case, contrary to intuition, that dyadic accuracy is usually
fairly weak.
Using the
PERSON
model, it appears that target accuracy increases with increasing acquaintance.
However, most of the increase occurs very early in the process. That is,
as we get to know more about someone, we do get to know them better, but
acquaintance has little effect on accuracy after observing about 50 or
so acts. When there is a kernel of truth in the stereotypes (that is, stereotypes
are partially valid), the relationship between accuracy and acquaintance
is relatively flat. Recent work by Lee et al. suggests that there is a
kernel of truth to some stereotypes. Likely then acquaintance results in
weak increase in accuracy.
Cronbach, L. J. (1955). Processes affecting scores
on "understanding others" and "assumed similarity." Psychological Bulletin,
52, 177-193.
Kenny, D. A., Kieffer, S., Smith, J., Ceplenski, P.,
& Kulo, J. (1996). Circumscribed accuracy among well-acquainted individuals.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 1-12.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). The psychology of being "right":
The problem of accuracy in social perception and cognition. Psychological
Bulletin, 106, 395-409.
Lee, Y. T., Jussim, L. & McCauley, C. (Eds.). (1995).
Stereotype accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences. Washington,
DC: The American Psychological Association.
Levesque, M. J., & Kenny, D. A. (1993). Accuracy
of behavioral predictions at zero acquaintance: A social relations analysis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1178-1187.
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Perceiver accuracy usually cannot be measured because
people do not seem to elicit the same behaviors from others. Generalized
accuracy has been obtained at
zero
acquaintance. Consistent with work by Ambady and Rosenthal, judgments based on "thin slices" of behaviors has surprising
validity. When the perceiver and target are well-acquainted, there is also
generalized accuracy.
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Chapter 7 of
Interpersonal
Perception: A Social Relations Analysis