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Critical acclaim.
Description
People make judgments about others all the time, often without realizing they are doing so. How are interpersonal impressions formed? How accurate are our perceptions of other people's traits and our own? In this major revision of my often-cited work, I provide a reader-friendly examination of these and other critical questions, identifying key components that shape impressions and their accuracy. Topics include how to estimate perceiver, target, and relationship effects; the extent to which different perceivers see a target in the same way; the impact of group membership and stereotypes; and whether others see us as we see ourselves. Implications for interpersonal relationships and social behavior are highlighted.
This second edition is a new book with hardly any of the text of the first edition
included. This edition incorporates 25 years of theoretical, empirical, and
methodological advances. Several new and expanded topics, including
first impressions, individual differences in accuracy, implicit measures, and narcissism.
The book is
grounded in a reformulated conceptual model, the 2004 PERSON model. Moreover, I use
accessible non-technical language, humor, popular culture, and simplified figures to
elucidate complex ideas. Each chapter has "Practical Suggestions" apply the science to
real-world social situations and "Philosophical Implications."
Table of Contents, Summary, and Miscellanea
The three SRM components of perceiver, target, and
relationship are introduced as the basic elements of interpersonal
perception, much like the atom's protons, neutrons, and electrons. Those elements are
the perceiver effect (how the perceiver generally views targets), the target effect (how
the target is viewed generally by perceiver), and the relationship effect (how the
perceiver uniquely views the target).
The book examines not only the perception of others but also self-perceptions
and metaperceptions or the perception of a target's perceptions. These perceptions
are primarily trait perceptions that are organized using the Big
Five or Big Two (Dominance and Friendliness), but attraction is also discussed. The context of perception matters,
especially the acquaintance between the perceiver and the target. The chapter outlines the nine basic questions of interpersonal perception that are considered in the remainder of the book.
The chapter notes the important contribution of Timothy Leary on the number of underlying traits (possibly 1 to 32) and discusses the personalities of Marge and Homer Simpson.
To view a sample chapter, Chapter 1,
click here.
Assimilation is the tendency to a perceiver to see others as similar, and can be
measured by the proportion of total variance due to the perceiver effect. On average,
assimilation explains about a quarter of the
total variance for trait judgments, but as the chapter describes the level of
assimilation varies considerably.
For attraction, the level of assimilation is generally lower than it is for traits. For trait judgments, assimilation declines
with increasing familiarity,
which supports the view that the perceiver effect represents the perceiver's
best guess of what targets are like, what is called a personal stereotype.
Also consistent with the view that the perceiver effect is a best guess is the
finding that assimilation is greater for less observable or visible traits, especially
when they are highly evaluative.
The variance of the perceiver can be divided into three parts. The largest part is positivity, the tendency for some perceivers to see others
generally positively on all traits and for other perceivers to see others generally negatively. A smaller part of assimilation is due to acquiescence or the tendency for some perceivers to agree that person has the trait, whether is is positive or negative traits, and other perceivers to generally see others as scoring low on traits. The smallest source of variance is trait specific variance: For a given trait some perceivers view others as generally having the trait, whereas other do not. This last piece is called a personal stereotype.
Generally, perceivers see different sets of targets, for example ingroup and outgroup members, on traits in a similar
fashion. However, there are some differences between the average perceptions of members from different
groups, which weakens the argument that there is a single view of the other, i.e., the generalized other. Attraction judgments of in-group and out-groups show
weaker levels of consistency than do trait judgments.
The perceivers who see others positively are women, the securely attached, and non-narcissists, but none of these effects is very large.
Generally, those with the larger perceiver effect enjoy slightly better mental health.
Two of the key papers discussed in this chapter were published in 2010, one by Sanjay
Srivastava, Steve Guglielmo, and Jennifer Beer, and another by
Dustin Wood, Peter Harms, and Simine Vazire. One finding discussed in this chapter
is that how people see other people is similar to how they see dogs, research conducted by
Virginia Kwan, Samuel Gosling, and Oliver John. Differences between perceiver
effects should be used more often to study prejudice and discrimination towards groups.
Research dating back to 1924, has shown that level of agreement or consensus is about .20, i.e., 20 percent of the total variance is target variance. Alternatively, the .20 value can be viewed as the correlation between perceivers' judgments of two different targets. Much of the work on consensus in first impressions is based on the "zero-acquaintance" paradigm, pioneered by Linda Albright, Thomas Malloy, and myself, which was based on earlier work by Norman and Goldberg.
Weaker, though non-zero, consensus is found for the judgment of faces.
Consensus is greatest for Extraversion, followed by Conscientiousness. Viewing people's bedrooms or offices also shows evidence for consensus, though consensus is greater for Openness, followed by Conscientiousness. Evidence also supports the view that first impressions are surprisingly accurate, with an estimate an accuracy value of .35 for the average judgment a .16 value for an individual's judgment. In large part, the acceptance of this conclusion is due to Nalini Ambady and Robert Rosenthal's pioneering work on thin slices. It is important to realize that first impressions are not 100% accurate. In fact, a .16 correlation for individual implies that approximately 42% of the time the judgment would be mistaken. The chapter examined the question of whether a first impression is a lasting impression, and the evidence is partially consistent with the naive view that indeed "a first impression is a lasting impression." Interestingly, the consensual piece appears to be relatively permanent, but the relational part is highly changeable. Agreement and accuracy of perceivers' first impressions is largely based on stereotypes.
Evidently, there is a kernel of truth due stereotypes, a topic extensively revisited in Chapter 5. The chapter considers the claim by several researcher that first impressions are inaccurate. While I reject these arguments, I nonetheless present them so that the reader can make his or her own determination. It is interesting to note that the initial title of Jane Austin's book Pride and Prejudice was First Impressions.
Chapter 4: The Content of Our Apparent Character, Consensus
Consensus represents the agreement between perceivers in their judgment of a
common target. It is indexed by the proportion of the total variance due to the target effect and can alternatively be viewed as the correlation between different perceivers in judging a common target. The overall level of consensus for long-term acquaintances is around .39, as measured by the ratio of target variance to the total variance. Studies that measured consensus when perceivers have just met the target and interacted for a brief amount of time with the target show consensus of about .23.
Target effects are highly consistent over time. In fact, moving beyond zero acquaintance, researchers find exceptionally large level of stability of the target effect, correlations in the 90s. There is also a fair amount of consistency across different target groups, with a reasonable estimate for that consistency correlation being .70.
Lastly, in terms of the Big Two, Dominance and Friendliness are relatively uncorrelated. For the Big Five, there appears to be some weak correlations. In terms of moderators, there is evidence for greater consensus for Extraversion followed by Openness, with the other three Big Five factors trailing. Both visibility and evaluativeness moderate consensus, with visibility having a positive effect on consensus and evaluativeness a negative effect, and the effect of visibility is larger than the effect of evaluativeness. Positive and negative traits do not appear to differ in terms of the level pf consensus. Outcome dependency is also a factor that leads to me consensus and may be implicated in cultural differences in consensus. Finally, it is found that there is usually more consensus in judging ingroup members than outgroup members. Interestingly and surprisingly, across 15 longitudinal studies and 64 measures, consensus does not increase with increased acquaintance. This result is in contradiction to most of the cross-sectional studies, reviewed above, that show an increased consensus as a function of acquaintance. The best resolution is that there is a large increase in consensus as a function of initial acquaintance, but once there is some acquaintance, the rate of increase is very small. The PERSON model presumes that a perceiver's impression of a target is a function of the perception of the target's appearance and the appraisal of the target's actions. (The PERSON model is very complicated, though the details of those complications are presented in Appendix C and so many readers may wish to skip reading those complicated details.) The model has six different variables that create the acronym PERSON. Additional parameters are the number of acts perceived, the overlap of the behavioral information perceived by two perceivers, two kernel-of-truth parameters, and the communication between perceivers. The PERSON model can explain some of the results in this chapter. It does predict an initial large increase in consensus as a function of increasing acquaintance and then a slow, gradual increase. It also predicts the surprisingly small effect of two perceivers seeing the same behaviors versus seeing different behavior on the level of consensus, as well as the incredibly large levels of stability of the target effect over time. The model needs to be altered to explain the less-than-perfect cross-context consensus. The chapter relies heavily on the extensive meta-analysis conducted by Brian Connelly and Deniz Ones in 2010. It is suggested that there might exist a Mercurialness factor in the target effect. That is, someone might exhibit highly agreeable traits (e.g., warm) as well as highly disagreeable traits (e.g., cold). This chapter shows that the relationship effect dominates perceptions of others' personalities, as well as how much people like one another. For trait ratings of the Big Five, about 40% of variance is due to relationship effects, and for interpersonal attraction, that percentage rises to about 60%. Person perception is fundamentally idiosyncratic, a phenomenon that is not well appreciated by the research or practitioner communities.
Although not the primary focus of this chapter, results for assimilation and consensus in perceptions for both trait ratings, 26 studies, and attraction studies, 18 studies, are also reviewed. For trait ratings at zero acquaintance, there is 33% assimilation, whereas well-acquainted people show only a 22% assimilation. Consensus appears to increase with acquaintance, starting at 20% at zero acquaintance and ending up at 39% for long-term acquaintance. For interpersonal attraction, consensus accounts for about 20% of the variance, regardless of the level of acquaintance. However, for romantic attraction, the variance partitioning is somewhat different than it is for non-romantic attraction in that there is about 75% more target variance. It appears that the reason for this increase in consensus for romantic relatinships is the importance of physical attractiveness in determining initial romantic attraction. Assimilation is strongest at brief acquaintance, accounting for about one-third of the total variance. Likely, the result is reflecting how much the person likes being a member of the group.
Attraction and trait judgments are highly related to each for all three SRM components: perceiver, target, and relationship. However, attraction does not explain all of the variation in trait judgments. In fact, there is good evidence that all three SRM components for traits are multidimensional. Consequently, it is impossible for one factor, attraction, to explain all of their variance. It remains an open question whether attraction leads to trait judgments or vice versa. Within the SRM, there are two different reciprocity correlations: One is the correlation between perceiver and target effects, called generalized reciprocity. The other is the correlation between relationship effects, called dyadic reciprocity. Little or no reciprocity for traits was found. However, there is some evidence of positive generalized reciprocity for Friendliness. For attraction, especially when people are well acquainted, there is a great deal of dyadic reciprocity, with the average correlation being around .52. Romantic attraction shows negative generalized reciprocity (people desired by others are very choosy), and that effect appears to be due in part to the effects of physical attractiveness (attractive people are both desirable and selective). Given the strong dyadic reciprocity for attraction, it seems unlikely that liking is a strong cause of trait judgments, as trait judgments do not show dyadic reciprocity. Understanding the meaning of uniqueness and the relationship effect is a much more difficult task than describing it. The most commonly accepted theoretical approach to uniqueness is matching -- characteristics of the perceiver and target are matched -- but operationally matching is a difficult hypothesis to test. Other approaches should be considered: person models proposed by Bernadette Park and agent-based models. The view that relationship effects are emergent within the dynamics of interpersonal interactions also has possibilities, but a strategy for testing the model needs to be developed. It is suggested that the relatively low over-time stability of the relationship effect for attraction may be part of the reason why societies make it difficult for married couples to divorce. Chapter 6:Peeling Away the Onion, Target Accuracy
Determining whether trait perceptions are valid is not so each a question to answer.
One issue is what can be taken as the truth.
Typically, self-judgments, knowledgeable informants, and
behavioral measures are used to measure the truth.
Each has advantages and disadvantages.
The second issue is that there is not a single accuracy, but rather many.
Based a framework that Linda Albright and I developed, the focus is on four different SRM measures or accuracy: generalized accuracy (If a target is generally seen by perceivers in a certain way, does the target act that way?), perceiver accuracy (If a perceiver generally sees targets in a certain way, do those targets act in that way with
the perceiver?), dyadic accuracy (If a perceiver sees a target in a particular, does
that target act that way with that perceiver?), and
constant bias (Do people over or estimate a particular behavior in others?).
It is
noted that generalized and dyadic accuracy approximately correspond to
William Swann's global and circumscribed accuracy.
In Chapter 3, the accuracy of an individual's first impressions was estimated to be .16. What is the level of accuracy when perceivers know the target well? Using the 1994 fraternity study and the 2007 aggression study, the average generalized accuracy correlation for individual is .32. Converting these correlations to rough probabilities, the .16 zero-acquaintance accuracy correlation implies being right about 58% of the time, whereas a correlation of .32 between well-acquainted individuals implies about a 66% chance of being correct. Thus, about half of what perceivers would ultimately know about targets is learned in the first few minutes, if not seconds. Moreover, even when perceivers are well acquainted with the target, they are still wrong about one time out of three.
The implications of the PERSON model for target accuracy are explored. That model predicts that most of the increase in accuracy happens very early on in the acquaintance process. Moreover, the presence of a kernel of truth can lead to interesting relationships of acquaintance with accuracy.
A kernel of truth tends to flatten the relationship whereas a "grain of falsehood" results an initial negative accuracy that eventually becomes positive. As estimate of kernel of truth, the correlation of aggregated judgments with the truth, using the PERSON model is .36. Arie Kruglanski quite incisively observed that in measuring the truth in person perception, the measure of the truth is itself a person perception. He went on to argue that all measures of accuracy are actually a form of consensus. Chapter 7:
Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall: Self-Other Agreement and Assumed Similarity
Self-other agreement is often used in accuracy research.
A person does see him- or herself in the same way as others, self-other agreement.
However, the level of self-other agreement is lower than consensus; that is,
two peers agree more than that self does the self with one peer. Self-other
agreement increases with increased acquaintance, visibility of the trait, and likely
the evaluativeness of the trait. Assumed similarity has a long history in psychology and perhaps most familiar to readers as the false consensus effect. Perceivers assume that others are similar to themselves, assumed similarity. However, the level of assumed similarity is lower than
assimilation; that is a person sees two peers as more similar than does the self views him or herself as similar to a peer.
Assumed similarity is lowered by visibility and increased by ingroup membership. At least in Western cultures, most people see themselves as better than they see others.
However, this effect is weakened and even reversed if self and other are close.
Following the analysis of Virginia Kwan, self-enhancement is viewed the
self-perception minus
how the person sees others (the perceiver effect) and minus how others
see the person (the target effect).
This measure of self-enhancement can be interpreted
as the relationship effect for self-perceptions. An extension of the Kwan approach,
the "k and q" method is presented.
In terms of consistency, self-relationship
effects are highly differentiated across the Big Five. If a person self-enhances on
one Big Five trait, he or she may not do so on another trait. However, there is
strong consistency over time in self-enhancement. There is some evidence that relational self-perceptions are more varied than the relational impressions of
others. There is also evidence that the perceptions of the self vary across interaction partners but there is no consistent evidence that certain persons
elicit a particular self-perception.
Are others more accurate perceivers than the self?
The evidence is somewhat mixed, but certainly there are cases in which self-perceptions are less accurate than the perceptions of others.
One advantage of other-perceptions is that they can be aggregated across perceivers to increase reliability. Self-perceptions are integrated into the PERSON model and its implications for
self-other agreement, accuracy, and communication are discussed. Finally, the
empirical results are related to Samuel McAbee and Brian Connelly's Reputation-Trait-Identity model
and Simine Vazire's Self-Other Knowledge Asymmetry model. The chapter discusses the work of a Robins, a Robbins, and a Robyn.
I also pose the question: Who sees himself as more humble: Donald Trump or Pope Francis?
Chapter 8:
Putting Yourself in Someone Else's Tevas, Assumed Reciprocity and Meta-Accuracy
People believe that they make very consistent impressions on others. Some think they make very good impressions, whereas others think they make very poor impressions. This consistency in metaperceptions is stronger for traits than for attraction, and it is somewhat greater earlier in the acquaintance process. Although evidence for perceiver variance is overwhelming, there is little evidence for variance in the target effect: People do not agree about which targets are lenient judges of others and which are harsh. People do recognize that others see them differently, but this recognition is stronger for attraction than for traits and stronger for long-term than for short-term acquaintance. The consistency of metaperception is examined in various ways. First, there is considerable stability of the perceiver effect was found, although, as with impressions, the consistency is lower at the level of relationship. Second, there is limited research on the consistency of measures, but the little evidence supports consistency. Third, the one study that examined the consistency of metaperceptions across in-groups and out-groups does show some consistency. The perceiver effect has substantial positive correlations with a constellation of variables, the primary one being social anxiety. Additionally, people think that others see them very much the same way that they see themselves. Are these metaperceptions correct? Alternatively, is it the case that metaperceivers have no clue as to how they are seen? The inclination for metaperceivers to think others see them favorably (or unfavorably) turns out to be generally accurate, but these tendencies are exaggerated: Metaperceivers who think that they make good impressions are right in that targets do see them favorably, but not nearly as favorably as they think. Conversely, people who perceive others as not viewing them positively are also correct; however, they are not thought of as negatively as they think. How is meta-accuracy achieved? The evidence for traits generally supports the view that accuracy is achieved by inferring others' perceptions by using one's self-concept. When given the opportunity, metaperceivers also observe their own behavior and use it to infer target perceptions. People do try to read the other person's behavior, but it appears that people are not very successful at this task. Metaperception enhancement, or the extent to which metaperceivers think that others see them more favorably than others actually do, is examined. In general, the finding is for relatively weak levels of enhancement, certainly weaker levels than for self-enhancement. People metaperceive not only how targets see them, but also how targets see others. There is both accuracy and bias in these perceptions. Metaperceivers guess the perceptions of individual targets' perceptions of not only individuals but also social groups, something called meta-stereotypes. The evidence indicates what has been called pessimism: People believe that out-group members see their group more negatively than they actually do. The concept of metaperception can be broadened to include not only the perceptions of perception but also the perceptions of expectations or meta-expectations. Much of the content of the chapter is based on my prior collaborations with Bella DePaulo and Erika Carlson. The chapters considers the extent to which there are individual differences between perceivers in the ability to judge targets' personalities, to recognize emotion in targets, and to determine whether the target is lying or not. Besides individual differences between perceivers, also considered are individual differences between
targets and relationships. Generally, individual differences between perceivers are relatively small, especially for judging personality and detecting lies. For judging emotion, the individual differences are considerably larger, but still not very large, being much smaller than the individual differences found in most other areas of psychology. Consistently, target differences in accuracy are stronger than perceiver differences. This result was found for all three types of individual differences investigated in this chapter. At the very least, given the large differences between targets, to maximize power, a study needs to include more targets than perceivers. Relationship or dyad variance has not been a topic that has attracted much interest but is shown to be present in judgment of emotion. The chapter features Jeremy Biesanz's Social Accuracy Model, or SAM, which provides the most complete analysis of individual differences in interpersonal accuracy. Moreover, besides measuring accuracy, SAM can offer insights into how perceptions of others are biased. SAM is complicated, and it can be difficult to conduct the analysis and to understand the meaning of the analysis. Likely, SAM or some variant of SAM will be increasingly used by researchers who are interested in the accuracy of social perception. The chapter includes a tribute to Robert Rosenthal, who pioneered research in individual differences in the accuracy in the perception of emotions. It also extensively relies on a meta-analysis conducted by Katja
Schlegel, Thomas Boone, and Judith Hall, another meta-analysis conducted by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo, and several studies conducted by Hillary Anger Elfenbein.
The major point of this book is that the study of interpersonal perception
requires a partitioning of perceptions into perceiver, target, and relationship
components. Such a partitioning reveals the fundamentally different processes
operating for each of the components. For these components, three
different types of consistency can be examined. The book provides answers
to basic questions of interpersonal perception, and often those answers are
at different levels. The PERSON model can be used to integrate many of
these disparate findings. Considered first is an additional term in the SRM: the group
effect. Then I broaden the discussion beyond personality judgments and
interpersonal attraction to consider emotions, leadership, trust, and behavior,
both naughty and nice.
A new typology of the correspondence between dyadic measures,
called the Revised Laing Typology, is proposed. This typology considers two types of
perceptions: perceptions of the other and perceptions of objects. There are nine
measures of correspondence for perception of the other and four for perceptions of
the other. A common vocabulary for measures of dyadic correspondence should advance
the field of interpersonal perception.
The chapter and the book concludes with a brief history
of interpersonal perception research. Two key developments are the interest of personality researchers in the topic and intense interest of European researchers, most notably the PERSOC group and family researchers. Europeans have been especially creative in improving the estimation of the SRM. Moreover, individual researchers have
made key contributions, including Hillary Anger Elfenbein, David Marcus, Paul Eastwick, Eli Finkel, and
Brian Connelly. Interpersonal perception researchers are in
most areas of psychology - social, personality, clinical, developmental, and industrial-organizational, human development and family studies, communications, and business have made important discoveries. The future looks very promising and exciting.
The material on the Revised Laing Typology was co-written with Tessa West.
The appendix begins with a formal description of the model. The estimates of
the Social Relations Model (SRM) effects and of the SRM variances and correlations are presented. Described also is how correlations between two different
variables can be computed. Also discussed how to measure the simultaneous effect of two or more variables
on an outcome. The section that follows contains a description of methods of
estimating the SRM. The final section contains details about the Social Accuracy
Model (SAM), which is an extension of the SRM to estimate individual
differences in judgmental accuracy.
The appendix features the ongoing contributions of Steffen Nestler, Oliver Ludtke, and many others.
For each of the hundreds of numeric results presented in the text, the source from
which the result was from is described.
Appendix C:
Details of the PERSON Model
The appendix presents the new standard values that
are used in this book, as well as their empirical and theoretical justification. The basic PERSON formulas for consensus and accuracy are
presented for both, as well as formulas for how consensus and accuracy are affected
by the number of acts, as well as the kernel of truth. It is shown how the consensus and
accuracy values are altered as a function of averaging over multiple perceivers
(i.e., aggregation)
and communication. The effects of stability or consistency over time
are presented. In the final section, the assumptions of the model are critically
examined.
References
Definitions of the major terms are given here.
New Research Not Discussed in the Book
Below is a discussion of work conducted since the publication of the Interpersonal Perception book. Often the summary is edited version of the paper's abstract. References are included at the end of this section.
Chapter 3
Rau, Carlson et al. (2022) assessed perceiver effects repeatedly in small groups of strangers who got to know each other over the course of 2 to 3 weeks and examined the degree to which positivity differences were stable vs. changed systematically over time. Using second-order latent growth curve modelling, they tested whether initial positivity (i.e., random intercepts) could be explained by several personality variables and whether change (i.e., random slopes) could be explained by these personality variables and by perceivers’ social experiences within the group. Across three studies, personality variables characterized by specific beliefs about others, such as agreeableness and narcissistic rivalry, were found to explain initial positivity but personality was not reliably linked to changes in positivity over time. Instead, feeling liked and, to a lesser extent, being liked by one’s peers, partially explained changes in positivity. The results suggest that perceiver effects are best conceptualized as initially reflecting personal generalized stereotypes but as group members become more acquainted, group-specific stereotypes are determined by a person's experiences in the group.
Rau, Niemeyer et al. (2022) and colleagues conducted two studies in which participants provided mutual impressions in distinct, uniquely composed groups. That is, a person was in a group with different members at the two times. Results revealed that the perceiver effects were quite consistent on the level of global evaluation and acquiescence but were less consistent on the level of specific trait content.
Chapter 4
An alternative model to the PERSON Model has been proposed by Leising and Schilling (2021). The model integrates several key concepts from PERSON Model and Brunswik’s lens model with one another. It incorporates time as a continuous variable and also accounts for target-effects, situation-effects, target by situation interaction effects, overall randomness, and between-target differences in randomness. All of these can influence the average level of a substance variable that may be observed by perceivers ("cues") and thus inform their judgments of targets.
The paper is abstract and highly mathematical. As the title suggests, a second paper will integrate the lens model into their framework.
Wilmot, Connelly, and Geeza (2022) have reanalyzed the data from the Geeza (2010) masters’ thesis that is discussed not only in Chapter 4 but also Chapters 4 and 7 (see especially Figure 7.1). It was primarily this study that was used to claim that the cross-context correlation of the targets was .73. Wilmot et al. in their new analysis find a somewhat lower value of about .70. Moreover, they find evidence that the correlation ranges from a high of .82 for Conscientiousness to a low of .61 for Emotional Stability.
Chapter 5
Schauf et al. (2022) in a meta-analysis examine generalized reciprocity, that is, the relationship between how people perceive others and how they are perceived by others. It tests the hypothesis that generalized reciprocity varies as a function of the content domain under investigation. Generalized reciprocity for attributes with primarily communal content (e.g., friendliness) was hypothesized to be more positive than generalized reciprocity for attributes with primarily agentic content (e.g., assertiveness). Sixty-four primary studies reporting correlations between perceiver and target effects with a total number of 17,561 participants were included in the analysis. Results of a multilevel meta-analytical random effects model showed that reciprocity correlations were slightly negative, but around zero, for primarily agentic attributes (r = -.05) and became more positive with increasing communal content (up to r = .18 for primarily communal attributes). Generalized reciprocity thus varied depending on the extent to which the regarded attribute is agentic versus communal. Chapter 7
Hughes et al. (2021) explored a way of understanding assumed similarity, which is usually thought to be a cognitive bias. Another possibility, however, is that it is due to an interpersonal path to perceived similarity: personality traits that are manifested in behavior may elicit similar or dissimilar behavior from others, and people form perceptions based on what they have elicited. These perceiver-elicited similarity effects would produce assumed similarity. The model has three stages: 1) A person's personality leads to behavior consistent with the person's traits; 2) In social interaction, the two persons' behaviors reciprocally influence each other. 3) A person's behavior leads to perception by the partner of the person's personality. The combination of these three effects leads to perceiver-elicited similarity. The results from the study showed evidence for perceiver-elicited similarity and general support for this model.
Chapter 8
Elsaadawy and Carlson (2022) examine if meta-perceivers who are more meta-accurate at judging new acquaintance are also good at judging close others. Across three studies, they find little or no consistency. That is, metaperceivers who were good at knowing how others initially viewed them were not necessarily good at know how close others viewed them.
Elsaadawy et al. (2021)
used the Social Accuracy Model (see Chapter 9) to predict metaperceivers' metaperceptions to predict the perceptions of perceivers of those metaperceivers across a set of traits. In this way, individual differences in meta-accuracy could be assessed for metaperceivers (Are some metaperceivers more accurate than others?), perceivers (Is it easier to perceive the perceptions of some perceivers than others?), and dyads (Are people especially good at perceiver some people and not so good at perceiver others?). In three studies, participants interacted with new acquaintances and these individual differences were measured. The greatest in meta-accuracy was for metaperceivers, followed by dyads, and lowest for perceivers. The authors tested whether metaperceivers self-perceptions accounted for these individual differences.
Chapter 9
A major extension of the Social Relations Model was proposed by Megan Goldring, Taeyun Jung, and myself (Kenny et al., 2022). A fairly readable description is available in the The EJP Blog. The changes in allow for the measurement of individual differences in target and relationship variances for perceivers and perceiver and relationship variances for targets. The paper can be accessed at https://osf.io/ejpk5.
Four major changes to the model are proposed. The first, called Sensitivity, allows target effects to be stronger for some perceivers than other perceivers.
The second, called Differentiation, allows some perceivers to have more relationship or error variance than other perceivers. The third, called Prototypicality, allows perceiver effects to be stronger for some targets than other targets.
The fourth, called Volatility, allows some targets to have more relationship or error variance than other targets. The combination of high Sensitivity and Low Differentiation leads to a strong correlation of a perceiver's judgments with the target effect, which is called Accuracy.
The combination of high Prototypicality and Low Volatility leads to a strong correlation of a judgments of a target with the perceiver effects, which is called Amplification. The utility of these constructs is illustrated in a re-analysis of a study of 160 perceivers, 40 targets, and 20 traits.
Chapter 10
Letzring et al. (2021) summarize what they see as consensual finding is the studies of interpersonal perception. The 2019 Interpersonal Perception book is used as the basis for several of their conclusions.
References
Elsaadawy, N., & Carlson, E. N. (2022). Is meta-accuracy consistent across levels of acquaintanceship? Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 13, 178-185.
Elsaadawy, N., Carlson, E. N., & Human, L. J. (2021). Who influences meta-accuracy? It takes two to know the impressions we make. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 121, 201-214.
Hughes, B. T., Flournoy, J. C., & Srivastava, S. (2021). Is perceived similarity more than assumed similarity? An interpersonal path to seeing similarity between self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 121, 184-200.
Kenny, D. A., Goldring, M. R., & Jung, T. (2022). The Extended Social Relations Model: Understanding dissimilation and dissensus in the judgment of others. European Journal of Personality, in press.
Leising, D., & Schilling, R. (2021, October 4). Mathematical model of person judgment: Part 1 (cue emergence). https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/myua4
Letzring, T. D., Murphy, N. A., Allik, J., Beer, A., Zimmermann, J., & Leising, D. (2021). The judgment of personality: An overview of current empirical research findings. Personality Science. [Open peer-review]. PsychOpen GOLD. https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.5161.
Rau, R., Carlson, E. N., Dufner, M., Geukes, K., Kraft, L., Krause, S., Nikoleizig, L., Nestler, S., & Back, M. D. (2022). Positivity in peer perceptions over time: Personality explains variation at zero-acquaintance, popularity explains differential change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, in press.
Rau, R., Niemeyer, L., Lawless DesJardins, N., Back, M. D., Srivastava, S., & Nestler, S. (2022). Perceiver effects in first impressions reflect generalized stereotypes: Evidence of consistency across time, groups, and contexts. Social Psychological and Personality Science, in press. Schauf, T., Dufner, M., Nestler, S., & Rau, R. (2022). Do agency and communion explain the relationship between perceiver and target effects in interpersonal perception? A meta-analysis on generalized reciprocity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, in press.
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Critical Acclaim Eli Finkel
Kenny - a towering genius and social/personality psychology's true north - has written a book for the ages. In engaging and nontechnical prose, this book orients readers to the foundational elements of social interaction, offering deep insight into topics like consensus, accuracy, stereotyping, reciprocity, metaperception, self-perception, self-enhancement, and group dynamics. This book is essential reading for anybody seeking to understand human sociality.
Tessa West
With the methods revolution, this book provides a 'must read' of the most solid and replicable social scientific research on person perception. Very few authors could weave a narrative of how decades of person perception research unfolded in the social sciences as astutely-and entertainingly-as Dave Kenny. William Swann This volume provides a comprehensive, up-to-date overview of person perception through the lens of Kenny's Social Relations Model-arguably the field's most innovative and creative tool for gaining insights into how people view themselves and others. The years since the first edition have given the author far more material to work with, and he has been generous in sharing his wisdom. Readers will delight that Kenny has made the content much more accessible. This volume is an indispensable reference for all social scientists interested in person perception, and will also make an excellent graduate-level textbook. David Funder (from the forward)
Readers of this book are in for a rare treat. The book usefully updates and expands Kenny's landmark exposition published in 1994 (a mere 25 years ago), but it is much more than a mere "second edition." The topics are expanded to include, for just one important example, a thorough and even profound exposition of self-perception, as well as fascinating philosophical musings and useful applications at the end of every chapter. Thanks to David Kenny for doing the work, providing the insight, and organizing the field of interpersonal judgment at this crucial point in its history, when the field can be considered mature but is also confronting a number of possible directions as to where to go next.
Preface
Chapter 1.
The Atomic Structure of Interpersonal Perception
Chapter 2:
They All Look Alike, Assimilation
Chapter 3.
Perception at First Sight
Chapter 5:
You Are Very Unique, Uniqueness and Reciprocity
Chapter 9:
Good, Bad, and Ugly Judge, Target, and Pair
Chapter 10:
Finis
Appendix A:
Details of the Social Relations Model
Appendix B:
Details on the Reported Results
Glossary click here)
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Sample Chapter
